Memory, reasoning, and categorization: parallels and common mechanisms by Brett K. Hayes et al.
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 17 June 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00529
Memory, reasoning, and categorization: parallels and
common mechanisms
Brett K. Hayes1*, Evan Heit 2 and Caren M. Rotello 3
1 School of Psychology, University of New SouthWales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
2 School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts, University of California, Merced, CA, USA
3 Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA
Edited by:
Michael Dougherty, University of
Maryland at College Park, USA
Reviewed by:
Ingmar Visser, Universiteit van
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Richard J. Tunney, University of
Nottingham, UK
*Correspondence:
Brett K. Hayes, School of Psychology,
University of New SouthWales,
Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
e-mail: b.hayes@unsw.edu.au
Traditionally, memory, reasoning, and categorization have been treated as separate
components of human cognition.We challenge this distinction, arguing that there is broad
scope for crossover between the methods and theories developed for each task. The
links between memory and reasoning are illustrated in a review of two lines of research.
The ﬁrst takes theoretical ideas (two-process accounts) and methodological tools (signal
detection analysis, receiver operating characteristic curves) from memory research and
applies them to important issues in reasoning research: relations between induction and
deduction, and the belief bias effect.The second line of research introduces a task in which
subjects make either memory or reasoning judgments for the same set of stimuli. Other
than broader generalization for reasoning than memory, the results were similar for the
two tasks, across a variety of experimental stimuli and manipulations. It was possible to
simultaneously explain performance on both tasks within a single cognitive architecture,
based on exemplar-based comparisons of similarity. The ﬁnal sections explore evidence
for empirical and processing links between inductive reasoning and categorization and
between categorization and recognition. An important implication is that progress in all
three of these ﬁelds will be expedited by further investigation of the many commonalities
between these tasks.
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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that memory, categorization, and reasoning
are all central components of human cognition. But traditionally
they have been treated as separate components. Each has been
studied using different paradigms and very different theoretical
models have been developed to explain each activity. This separa-
tion extends to the way that students are taught about each topic;
memory and reasoning, for example typically appear in different
sections of Cognitive Psychology textbooks (Heit andHayes, 2008).
To some extent this separation is warranted. Understanding the
cognitive processes involved in any one of these areas represents
a major scientiﬁc challenge. Much of our current understanding
of human memory, reasoning, and categorization has only been
achieved via the development of specialized methods and models
in each domain. However, it could be argued that the fractionation
of the study of human cognition sometimes obscures deeper com-
monalities between tasks and processes. Newell (1973) famously
pointed out that the proliferation of phenomena studied in experi-
mental psychology and the dichotomous division of psychological
processes (e.g., continuous versus discrete representations, ana-
log versus digital processing) can impede theory development and
cumulative scientiﬁc progress. As a remedy Newell suggested that
cognitive scientists should examine how a single processing sys-
tem may be extended to explain a variety of disparate tasks [see
Dale et al. (2009) and Garcia-Marques and Ferreira (2011) for
recent, related arguments]. In this spirit therefore, this article
and the other papers in this Research Topic examine the possible
commonalities (as well as key differences) among these three key
areas of cognition.
Of course, ours is not the only attempt to highlight the
deeper connections between seemingly disparate cognitive activ-
ities. Logan (2002) for example, developed an instance-based
theory that explains phenomena in the domains of both atten-
tion and memory. Connectionist (e.g., Kinder and Shanks, 2003;
Rogers and McClelland, 2004) and Bayesian models of cognition
(e.g., Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2009) often emphasize the com-
mon processing mechanisms involved in learning and memory
or in different types of reasoning. To our knowledge, however,
the current work is one of the ﬁrst attempts to examine the
links between the three domains of memory, reasoning, and
categorization.
ANALOGIES BETWEEN MEMORY AND REASONING
Elsewhere we have discussed in detail the different types of rela-
tions that may be found between two of these domains, reasoning,
and memory (Heit and Hayes, 2005, 2011; Heit and Rotello, 2005;
Heit et al., 2012). One notable relation is that analogous research
questions have been posed in each area. For example, in both
ﬁelds there is a lively and on-going debate concerning the num-
ber of core processes that drive people’s judgments. According to
two-process accounts of memory (Rotello and Heit, 1999; Yoneli-
nas, 2002; Wixted and Mickes, 2010), recognition judgments are
driven by two different psychological mechanisms; a relatively
fast and automatic assessment of item familiarity, and a slower,
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deterministic process based on item recollection. These processes
are often invoked to explain functional dissociations between judg-
ments made under instructions to recognize any item that feels
familiar (“know” instructions) in contrast to recognizing items
for which associated details can be retrieved (“remember” instruc-
tions). In contrast “single process” accounts (Wixted and Stretch,
2004; Dougal and Rotello, 2007; Dunn, 2008) suggest that recog-
nition is driven by a single underlying mechanism (assessment of
an item’s “memory strength”) and that the distinction between
remember and know judgments can be explained by shifts in
the criterion for making a response (with a more conservative
criterion used for “remember” instructions; Donaldson, 1996).
In terms of signal detection theory (SDT), the single-process
theory explains the difference between remember and know judg-
ments as a change in response criterion rather than memory
sensitivity.
An analogous distinction between dual- and single-process
models can be found in research on deductive and inductive rea-
soning. Descriptively, deduction involves deciding whether an
inference necessarily follows from a given set of premises (e.g.,
if “Birds have property X” then it follows that “Sparrows have
property X”). Induction on the other hand, involves assessing the
plausibility of an inference given the premises (e.g., if “Sparrows
have property X” then it seems likely that other birds share that
feature, even though this is not necessarily true). Dual-process
accounts (e.g., de Neys, 2006; Evans, 2008; Heit and Rotello,
2010) argue that each type of reasoning draws on qualitatively
different cognitive processes. Induction is characterized as fast,
intuitive, and heuristic whereas deduction is characterized as slow
and making use of deterministic rules similar to those used in
symbolic logic. In contrast, single-process models (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 1994; Oaksford and Chater, 2007) assume that both types of
reasoning may be the result of a single common process but may
differ in their decision criteria (with a more conservative criterion
used in deduction; see Rips, 2001).
An important implication of this analogy is that the methods
used to compare processing models in one area, such as memory,
may be useful in advancing the debate in another area, such as
reasoning (cf. Medin et al., 1995, for a related argument regard-
ing parallels between issues in decision making and similarity
judgment). In research on memory for example, signal detec-
tion methods have been used to evaluate single- and dual-process
models of recognition. Several types of SDT patterns are seen as
evidence against a single process, such as differences in sensitivity
for different types of judgment, differences in the slope of receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves, and a non-monotonic rela-
tionship between the two types of judgments across probe items
(Rotello et al., 2004; Wixted and Mickes, 2010).
Heit et al. (2012) have used an analogous signal-detection
approach to test single- and dual-process models of reasoning.
Adapting the paradigm ﬁrst used by Rips (2001), participants
were asked to evaluate logically valid or invalid arguments under
instructions that emphasized either deductive validity or induc-
tive plausibility. A number of factors such as the typicality of the
premise item (Heit and Rotello, 2005), the number of premises
consistent with the conclusion (Rotello and Heit, 2009) and the
similarity of premise and conclusion items (Heit and Rotello,
2010), were found to have a more profound impact on inductive
than deductive judgments. Conversely the logical validity of argu-
ments hadmore of an effect on deduction. Moreover, when people
doing deduction were placed under time pressure they showed
reduced sensitivity to the logical validity of items and increased
sensitivity to premise-conclusion similarity; in other words, under
time pressure those doing deduction made decisions that were
more consistent with induction (Heit and Rotello, 2010).
Signal detection analyses of these data generally favored a two-
process interpretation. Induction and deduction judgments for
valid and invalid items were found to differ in sensitivity, not
just in response bias or criterion location (Rotello and Heit, 2009;
Heit and Rotello, 2010). Conﬁdence ratings for induction and
deduction judgments were also used to construct ROC curves.
Contrary to single-process predictions, the shapes of these curves
also differed for induction and deduction, with signiﬁcantly more
area under the curve found for deduction ROCs, reﬂecting bet-
ter discrimination between valid and invalid items. In subsequent
modeling Heit and Rotello compared the ﬁt of two signal detec-
tionmodels to theROCdata. Theone-dimensionalmodel assumes
that the only difference between induction and deduction was in
response criterion. The two-dimensional model (see Figure 1)
assumes that two orthogonal types of information, roughly “log-
ical correctness” and “consistency with associative knowledge,”
contribute to reasoning, with different weighted proportions of
each type of information used in deduction and induction. Monte
Carlo simulations found that the single-process model failed to
capture key trends in the data, such as differences in the sensitivity
of induction and deduction judgments and the effects of argument
length and item similarity. The data, however, were well explained
by the two-dimensional model.
It would be premature to think that these results have settled the
debate in favor of two-process models of reasoning (see Lassiter
and Goodman, 2012; Stephens and Dunn, 2013 for alternative
single-process interpretations of studies comparing induction and
deduction). Nevertheless they can be seen as good examples of the
empirical innovation and theory development that can ﬂow from
drawing analogies between issues andmethods in thememory and
reasoning literatures.
A further example of a positive yield from the analogy between
memory and reasoning comes from applying signal detection
methods to the phenomenon of belief bias in deductive reasoning.
Belief bias refers to the fact that the ability to discriminate between
logically valid and invalid arguments is apparently affected by
the consistency of those arguments with background knowl-
edge and beliefs (Klauer et al., 2000). Consider the following two
arguments:
Believable Unbelievable
No addictive things are
inexpensive
No cigarettes are inexpensive.
Some cigarettes are
inexpensive
Some addictive things are
inexpensive.
Therefore, some addictive
things are not cigarettes
Therefore, some cigarettes are
not addictive
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic two-dimensional signal detection model of
induction and deduction. (Reproduced from Heit and Rotello, 2010).
These arguments have an identical logical structure. Neither
is valid. However, because the conclusion in the ﬁrst argument
is consistent with people’s background beliefs it is frequently
endorsed while the second argument is usually rejected (Evans
et al., 1983). Likewise people often have more difﬁculty accept-
ing logically valid arguments with unbelievable than believable
conclusions.
The belief bias has oftenbeenmeasuredby calculating an“inter-
action index.”This is the difference between two difference scores:
the rate of positive responding to valid unbelievable arguments
minus the response rate to invalid unbelievable arguments, and
the response rate to valid believable argumentsminus the response
rate to invalid believable arguments. This index is usually found
to be positive, reﬂecting the more difﬁcult discrimination for
arguments with believable conclusions.
For over three decades the interaction index has played a central
role in research and theory development in the ﬁeld of deduc-
tive reasoning (Klauer et al., 2000). Recent work (Dube et al.,
2010, 2011; Heit and Rotello, 2014) however, suggests that this
approach to measuring belief bias is ﬂawed. This method for mea-
suring deductive reasoning closely parallels a common approach
tomeasuring the accuracy of recognitionmemory; namely the cal-
culation of a “corrected” recognition score where the false alarm
rate is subtracted from the hit rate. The validity of this measure in
memory research is based on the assumption of a linear relation-
ship between hits and false alarms. However, in memory research
this assumption rarely holds (Dube and Rotello, 2012). Likewise,
Heit and Rotello’s work reviewed earlier suggests that deductive
judgments cannot be accounted for by a linear dimension of argu-
ment strength. In response Dube et al. (2010) collected validity
judgments and conﬁdence ratings for deductive syllogisms that
varied in validity and in the believability of their conclusions.
Analysis of ROC curves revealed that the belief basis effect primar-
ily reﬂects the use of a more liberal response for arguments with
believable as compared with unbelievable conclusions. Contrary
to the assumptions of many theories of deductive reasoning, there
was no evidence that sensitivity in detecting argument validity
was greater for unbelievable than believable arguments. With that
said, see Trippas et al. (2013) for evidence using this samemethod-
ology that there may be some exceptions based on individual
differences.
EVIDENCE FOR A DEEPER RELATIONSHIP: COMMON
PROCESSES IN MEMORY AND REASONING
The work reviewed in the previous section suggests that there are
strong analogies between the research questions examined in the
memory and reasoning literatures. In this section we examine
evidence that points to a deeper relationship between these tasks;
namely that they share common processing mechanisms.
Much of this work has focused on commonalities between
recognition judgments and inductive reasoning judgments (Heit
and Hayes, 2011; Hayes et al., 2013; Hayes and Heit, 2013).
Descriptively there seem to be good reasons for suspecting that
these tasks may share common processes. Each task begins with
the encoding of new information about a number of instances or
exemplars. In recognition this amounts to memorizing the items
presented at study. In induction this involves learning novel prop-
erties of study instances. Encoding is followedby a test phasewhere
the goal is either to distinguish studied from new instances (recog-
nition) or to infer which new instances have the same properties
as studied items (induction). Each type of judgment is assumed
to involve a comparison of the similarity of novel test probes with
members of the study set (Heit andHayes, 2011). Our thesis is that
the process of similarity comparison is the same for recognition
and induction, but that the tasks differ in how broadly responses
are generalized to novel items. The speciﬁc goal of recognition
decisions (is the probe similar enough to studied exemplars to
conclude that it is identical?) leads to a narrower generalization of
responding than in induction (is the probe item similar enough to
studied exemplars to conclude that it has the same properties?).
Our strategy for testing these ideas was as follows. First we
developed a research paradigmwhere a common study and test set
was presented under either recognition or induction instructions,
and we examined the empirical relationship between responses
to test items in each task. Second, we manipulated a range of
independent variables thought to impact the process of similar-
ity comparison (e.g., study exposure time, exposure frequency,
inclusion of child participants) and examined their effects on
recognition and induction judgments. Third, we developed an
exemplar-based model, GENeralization from EXamples (GEN-
EX) that assumed a common processing architecture for memory
and reasoning, andﬁtted it to our empirical data. The details of this
work have been reported elsewhere (Heit and Hayes, 2011; Hayes
et al., 2013; Hayes and Heit, 2013). Here, however, we illustrate
this research strategy by summarizing the method and outcomes
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of a new study examining the relations between recognition and
induction.
ITEM CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECOGNITION AND INDUCTION
As in previous work (e.g., Heit and Hayes, 2011; Hayes et al., 2013)
this study made use of a common paradigm for studying recogni-
tion and induction. Pictures of large dogs were presented at study
with instructions to memorize the items (recognition) or to learn
about animals that shared a novel property (induction). At test all
participants were shown the same test set, which contained studied
large dogs, easy-to-reject unstudied small andmedium-sized dogs,
and harder-to-reject lures (new large dogs). Those in the recogni-
tion condition were instructed to respond “yes” if they thought a
test item had been presented previously. Those in the induction
condition were instructed to respond “yes” if they thought the test
item had the same novel property as the study items.
Notably this study also manipulated the perceptual context in
which study and test items appeared. In both recognition and
induction conditions pictures of dogs were presented at study in
a distinctive perceptual context (i.e., surrounded by a “picture
frame” on a colored background, as illustrated in the top panel of
Figure 2). At test half of the old and new items were presented in a
“consistent context,” with old items appearing in the same context
as during study, and new items appearing in a novel (unstudied)
context. The remaining items were presented in a “reversed con-
text,” with old items appearing in a novel context and new items
presented in one of the contexts used during the study phase (see
bottom panel of Figure 2).
FIGURE 2 | Example of the context manipulation used in studies of recognition memory and induction.
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A common ﬁnding in recognition memory research is that
discrimination between old and new items is affected by such con-
textual manipulations (see Smith and Vela, 2001 for a review).
When an item is studied in a particular context and that context
is reinstated at test, recognition accuracy improves. Conversely,
recognition accuracy declines when an item is studied in a speciﬁc
context but tested in a different context (e.g., Tulving and Thom-
son, 1973; Murnane and Phelps, 1993; Murnane et al., 1999). The
presentation of a novel item in a familiar context can also increase
false recognition of that item (e.g., Thomson, 1988), sometimes to
the point that the data are better described as reﬂecting a criterion
shift (Dougal and Rotello, 1999).
At ﬁrst glance it may be hard to see why the context manip-
ulation should affect induction. Prominent theories of induction
(e.g., Osherson et al., 1990; Sloman, 1993) focus on the overlap
between the taxonomic features of premise and conclusion cate-
gories as the basis of inductive projection. Such approaches make
no mention of a possible role of perceptual context in property
induction.
Our exemplar-based approach, on the other hand, suggests that
both recognition and induction are affected by the speciﬁc similar-
ity between familiar and novel items (Heit and Hayes, 2011). We
assume that similarity computations are affected by the perceptual
context in which an exemplar is embedded with matching context
increasing the similarity between items and mismatching context
decreasing similarity. Based on these assumptionswe expected that
the context changes should affect both recognition and induction.
In both tasks we expected sharper discrimination between old and
new test items (i.e., less positive responding to novel items) when
item context remained consistent across study and test than when
it was reversed.
Equal numbers of undergraduates were allocated to either a
recognition or induction condition (N = 80). Those in the recog-
nition condition were told to memorize study items and that their
task at test was to discriminate between old and new items. Those
in the induction condition were told that at study they would learn
about animals that had the novel property of “beta cells” and that
their task at test was to determine what other animals had this
property.
At study participants in each group were shown 10 color pic-
tures of dogs. Each picture was presented together with its context,
for 2 s. After study therewas a 60 s unﬁlled retention interval before
the test phase. At test, 44 test pictures (10 old dogs, 20 new small
and medium dogs, 14 “lures” or new large dogs) were presented
in random order. Half were shown in a context that was consis-
tent with that seen at study (i.e., ﬁve of the old items appeared in
the same frame presented at study, and half of all the new items
appeared in novel frames). For the remaining test items, context
was reversed. That is, ﬁve old items appeared in novel frames and
half of the new items appeared in frames that were used during
study (see Figure 2).
Table 1 shows the proportion of “yes” responses in each condi-
tion. The rate of positive responding to all new items was higher in
induction than recognition, consistent with our expectation that
participants would be more likely to generalize to novel stimuli
in the induction task. For new small and medium dogs, the rate
of positive responding was higher when context was reversed than
Table 1 | Proportion of “yes” responses and d’s for recognition and
induction.
Context Task Old New small
and medium
Lure d’ (old–
new)
d’ (old–
lure)
Consistent Recognition 0.76 0.12 0.32 1.89 1.22
Induction 0.81 0.35 0.57 1.22 0.61
Reversed Recognition 0.70 0.17 0.30 1.18 1.11
Induction 0.80 0.37 0.55 0.85 0.61
when it was consistent, suggesting that the study context itself pro-
vided some degree of similarity match (e.g., Murnane and Phelps,
1994; Dougal and Rotello, 1999). Signal detection analyses found
that sensitivity (d′) in old–new discrimination was better in recog-
nition than in induction, F(1,78) = 8.83, p < 0.004, and better
when item context remained consistent between study and test,
F(1,78) = 24.89, p < 0.001. Crucially, there was no interaction
between task and context (F < 2.5); as predicted, changing item
context had analogous effects on recognition and induction.
The other important result in this experiment relates to the rela-
tionship between the probability of making a positive response to
test items in induction and recognition. The proportion of positive
responses was calculated for each test item (averaged across partic-
ipants) in each of the four experimental conditions, and itemwise
correlations between these proportions were calculated. The cor-
relation between recognition and induction respondingwas strong
and positive for both context consistent, r(20) = 0.94, p < 0.001,
and context reversed test items, r(20) = 0.95, p < 0.001. In other
words, in both context conditions it was possible to predict the
pattern of induction responses from recognition responses to the
same test items, and vice versa.
We were also able to successfully model these data using a com-
mon processing architecture for recognition and induction. The
GEN-EX model is embodied by two equations. Equation 1 shows
the familiarity rule: The familiarity of each test stimulus equals
its summed similarity to the n studied items, where similarity is
assumed to be a negative exponential function of psychological
distance between the test and study items (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986,
1988). The free parameter c reﬂects speciﬁcity of responding to
test items; lower values of c correspond to broader generaliza-
tion while higher values correspond to narrower generalization
gradients.
fam(test) =
n∑
i=1
exp(−c dist(test , studyi)) (1)
resp(test) = fam(test)
fam(test) + β (2)
The response rule is shown in Eq. 2. Essentially, the prob-
ability of a positive response is a monotonic function of a test
item’s familiarity. The response rule has a single scaling parameter,
β. A lower value of β corresponds to a greater overall tendency
to respond positively. To model recognition and induction judg-
ments using GEN-EX, we relied on empirical similarity ratings
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between pairs of study and test items collected in our previous
work (Heit and Hayes, 2011). The GEN-EX model was able to
reproduce key aspects of the data (e.g., higher response rate to
new items in induction than recognition, higher response rate
to new items in consistent context than reversed context), and
showed good overall ﬁt (RMSE= 0.11, correlation betweenmodel
and data = 0.91). Moreover the model parameters were con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions. When context remained
consistent across study and test the c parameter was lower for
induction (cIND = 2.31) than recognition (cREC = 3.37), indi-
cating broader generalization of responding for induction. When
context was reversed the c parameter was even lower for induc-
tion (cIND = 1.89, cREC = 3.47), reﬂecting a further reduction in
discrimination between old and new test items (NB. the value of
the β parameters remained relatively stable across task and con-
text manipulations). We acknowledge that there may be other
ways of modeling the effects of context on recognition and
induction (e.g., similarity in context may have a multiplicative
effect with the visual similarity between old and new dogs; cf.
Clark and Gronlund, 1996). Nevertheless the current model-
ing results serve as a demonstration that the role of context in
recognition and induction can be explained using the GEN-EX
framework.
Both the empirical and modeling results of this study paral-
lel those found in previous studies (Heit and Hayes, 2011; Hayes
et al., 2013; Hayes and Heit, 2013). Despite a higher rate of posi-
tive responding to novel items in induction than recognition, there
appear to bemany striking similarities between judgments on each
task. There is often a close empirical relationship between pat-
terns of test responding to test items in induction and deduction.
Moreover, manipulations like test context that affect the perceived
similarity between old and new items have parallel effects on the
two tasks. Finally a single exemplar-based similarity model that
allows for task differences in generalization gradients can explain
both recognition and induction performance.
This work strongly suggests that the links between memory
and reasoning go well beyond the level of analogy. When paradig-
matic differences are kept to a minimum there is good empirical
and modeling evidence for shared processes between these cog-
nitive acts. To date these links have primarily been investigated
between one formof reasoning (induction) and one formof mem-
ory (recognition). There is already some evidence, however, that
they might extend further. Hayes and Heit (2013) recently found
evidence of a strong empirical relationship between recognition
andmore complex forms of inductionwhich could involve ﬂexible
generalization along alternative property dimensions, especially
when judgments were made under time pressure. Moreover a
modiﬁed form of GEN-EX that allowed for the inclusion of multi-
ple forms of perceived similarity (e.g., with respect to habitat, with
respect to biology) was able to account for both recognition and
these more ﬂexible forms of induction.
LINKING RECOGNITION AND INDUCTION TO
CATEGORIZATION
In this ﬁnal section we brieﬂy consider evidence which sug-
gests that memory and reasoning may each be linked to a third
important cognitive activity, object categorization.
INDUCTION AND CATEGORIZATION
A close relationship between category structure and induction has
for some timebeen akey assumptionofmajor theories of category-
based induction (e.g., Osherson et al., 1990; Sloman, 1993; Medin
et al., 2003). According to these approaches the structural features
of natural categories profoundly affect the strength of inductive
inferences. Hence inductions tend to be stronger between mem-
bers of similar categories or when based on instances that are
considered typical category exemplars (see Hayes et al., 2010 for a
review).
There is also direct empirical evidence of the connection
between categorization and inductive judgments. Sloutsky and
Fisher (2004) for example, presented preschool children with
animal picture triads containing a target and two probes. One
probe had the same label as the target but low visual similar-
ity whereas the other probe had a different label but high visual
similarity. Different groups of children made either categoriza-
tion judgments (which probe was the same kind of animal as
the target?) or induction judgments (which probe shared a novel
property of the target?) about a number of such triads. There
was a very close correspondence between the probes that chil-
dren chose in the respective categorization and induction tasks
(itemwise correlation, r = 0.97).
A similar ﬁnding was reported by Rehder and Burnett (2005) in
a study with adults using artiﬁcial categories. After learning about
the typical features of a novel category and causal relations between
these features, participants were presented with a feature inference
task (infer the value of a missing feature given other exemplar fea-
tures) followed by a categorization task (rate the likelihood that the
same test item belongs to a target category). Again a strong empir-
ical relation between induction and categorization judgments was
found, especially when exemplars contained a feature that was a
common cause of other features (r = 0.99).
CATEGORIZATION AND RECOGNITION
Likewise, there is a body of evidence showing an empirical and
theoretically meaningful relationship between categorization and
recognition. Much of this evidence comes from studies of cat-
egories in which participants ﬁrst learn to assign exemplars to
contrasting categories and then make categorization or old–new
recognition judgments about a common set of test exemplars (e.g.,
Omohundro, 1981; Metcalfe and Fisher, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986;
Nosofsky and Zaki, 1998). These studies suggest that the empir-
ical relationship between recognition and classiﬁcation is more
complicated than the relationship between recognition and induc-
tion. Often the correlation between categorization and recognition
of a common test set is relatively low and there is no posi-
tive contingency between recognizing an item and categorizing
it (e.g., Omohundro, 1981; Metcalfe and Fisher, 1986). More-
over, amnesics have been shown to accurately categorize tests
instances that they do not recognize (e.g., Knowlton and Squire,
1993; Nosofsky and Zaki, 1998).
Crucially, however, Nosofsky (1986, 1988) and Nosofsky
and Zaki (1998) have shown that such empirical dissociations
between recognition and categorization are well explained by the
generalized context model (GCM) which assumes a single repre-
sentational system based on the storage of individual exemplars,
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but different decision rules in each task. Whereas recognition
responses are based on the summed similarity of a probe to all pre-
viously experienced exemplars (as in theGEN-EXmodel described
earlier and in the global matching models of memory; Clark and
Gronlund, 1996), categorization responses are based on the rel-
ative similarity of the probe to the exemplars of each alternative
category.
As a further test of this model Nosofsky et al. (2012) com-
pared categorization responses to a common test set to recognition
responses made under either “standard” instructions (emphasiz-
ing positive responding only on the basis of identity between old
and new items) or “lax” instructions (emphasizing responding to
all items that might have been old). Patterns of test responding as
well as associated patterns of brain activity in the lax recognition
condition were more similar to those in categorization than to
standard recognition. Moreover responses on all three tasks were
well described by a modiﬁed version of GCM that allowed for task
differences in response thresholds.
Such demonstrations of a single processing framework under-
lying categorization and recognitionmay seem at odds with claims
that category learning is driven by at least two psychologically
and neurally distinct systems (e.g., Ashby and Maddox, 2011).
This claim remains controversial (cf. Stanton and Nosofsky, 2007;
Newell et al., 2011) and a detailed consideration lies outside the
bounds of the current paper. We suggest, however, that the
approach for evaluating single and dual process accounts of rea-
soning outlined in an earlier section might be usefully adapted to
examine the issue of multiple categorization systems.
CONCLUSION
This review has highlighted the commonalities between reasoning
and memory, between categorization and reasoning, and between
categorization and memory. In terms of reasoning and memory,
we have shown that there is a close analogy between some of the
key research questions addressed in each area. Hence, methods
used to answer these questions in memory research (e.g., analysis
of ROC curves) can be usefully applied to address important issues
in reasoning.
The links between memory and reasoning go deeper than
surface analogy, however. We have shown that performance
on inductive reasoning and recognition memory tasks can be
explained by a single processingmodel that assumes each task has a
different threshold for generalizing encoded information to novel
instances. This conclusion is strikingly similar to the exemplar-
based account of the relationship between categorization and
recognition (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988; Nosofsky et al., 2012).
We still lack direct evidence of connections among all three
tasks; to our knowledge no one has yet collected inductive, recog-
nition, and categorization judgments for the same set of stimuli.
Nevertheless, the pattern of empirical links schematically summa-
rized in Figure 3 is highly suggestive. The Figure reinforces the
view that there are processing components common to all three
tasks. Our review suggests that one such component is the assess-
ment of the total similarity between novel items and experienced
items. The outputs of such similarity comparisons guide respond-
ing in each task, although the threshold for generalizing to novel
items varies parametrically across the three tasks.
FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of the empirical relations
between recognition memory, inductive reasoning, and
categorization, with example studies cited.
One implication of this review is that, as suggested by Newell
(1973), we should re-think some of the conventional bound-
aries within the domain of cognitive science. Dividing cognition
into separate domains such as memory, reasoning, categoriza-
tion, and so on, may have pedagogical value (e.g., when writing
textbooks or teaching classes). It may also make the study of
performance in each domain more tractable, at least at an
early stage of scientiﬁc progress. But it is important to keep
in mind that the boundaries between cognitive activities are
often due to pre-theoretical assumptions and socially constructed
conventions (cf., Kuhn, 1996), rather than direct empirical com-
parisons or attempts to model underlying processes. One of
the key aims of this review and the other invited submissions
in this Research Topic was to balance the study of fractionated
facets of cognition with an acknowledgment that seemingly dis-
parate tasks may often share common component processes (see
Hahn and Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005 for related approaches).
Our hope is that this will encourage other researchers to con-
sider and to investigate the relations among different cognitive
activities.
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